The coalition of factions engaged in combat within Lascanood, colloquially known as “Huwan” among the people of Somaliland, comprises an amalgamation described as the “enemy with many faces.” This alliance consists of Darood clan militia members hailing from Puntland in Somalia, the Somali region of Ethiopia, southern Somalia, northern Kenya, and the eastern border of Somaliland. The question arises: what commonality unites individuals from such diverse Somali-inhabited regions spanning several borders in the Horn of Africa? The answer, while straightforward, is intricate and warrants elucidation.
Primarily, all combatants share a tribal affiliation, belonging to the broader Darood clan. However, their motivations for involvement in the conflict in Lascanood are multifaceted. Some are aligned with religious extremism, associating with the perilous political Salafist entity known as Al-Ictissam, while others are members of the militant jihadist organization recognized as Al-Shabab. Additionally, there are those driven by tribal allegiances, perceiving themselves as saviors of the Dhulbahante Darood, native to the southeastern border of Somaliland. Figures such as Abdi Madobe, leaders of Al-Shabab-trained fighters, play pivotal roles within the political and military echelons of the groups active along Somaliland’s eastern border.
Although Somaliland has largely evaded the turmoil wrought by militant factions like Al-Shabab in Somalia, the current threat posed by a more insidious adversary highlights the infiltration of various Somali-speaking societies in the Horn of Africa and beyond.
The Rise of Al-Ictissam: A Challenge to Democracy and Political Islam
To grasp the genesis of Al-Ictissam, one must delve into its origins as a Salafi militant faction known as Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI). Formed in the early 1980s, Al-Itihad garnered support primarily from Ogadeni refugees following the 1977 Ethio-Somali war. The Ogaden, a sub-clan of the broader Darood clan, constituted its core base. While initially dormant, Al-Itihad emerged following the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, establishing a military presence in Ethiopia’s Ogaden region and exerting influence in Kenya’s NFD region. Recognizing the group as a significant threat, the Ethiopian government suppressed its activities in the Ogaden and supported Somali militants in displacing them from Somalia’s Gedo region.
AIAI engaged in clashes with the United Somali Congress (USC) in 1992, led by Mohamed Farah Aidiid of the Hawiye clan, a pivotal figure in toppling Siad Barre’s dictatorship. Despite AIAI’s purported transcendence of tribalism, it predominantly enjoyed Darood clan support and clashed with perceived adversaries such as Mohamed Farah Aidiid’s USC. Following defeats by the USC, AIAI sought refuge in Bossaso, a Majeerteen-Darood stronghold in Puntland. Eventually, internal conflicts led to confrontations with Puntland’s leadership, culminating in the group’s demise by 1994 and the emergence of two splinter Salafi organizations.
Among these, Al-Ictissam, established in 1996 in Lascanood, pursued a “politico” approach, while Al-Shabab garnered notoriety for its violent tactics, including suicide bombings. While differing in methods, both aimed to establish Salafist interpretations of Sharia law across Somali-inhabited territories, rejecting democratic governance. Al-Ictissam, in particular, endeavored to infiltrate civil society and civilian governments to foster Salafi-style theocracies, contrasting with Al-Shabab’s preference for violent regime changes.
Over the ensuing two decades, Al-Ictissam expanded its influence substantially, attracting followers across Somali clans and international borders. Despite its origins in Lascanood, the group boasts influential figures in various Somali-speaking communities, aided by dissemination of religious teachings via platforms like YouTube. Notable figures within the organization include Sheikh Mohamed Abdi Umal, based in Nairobi, who commands a significant international following. Although drawing support from diverse clans, Al-Ictissam’s leadership remains predominantly Ogaden Darood, exemplified by figures like Sheikh Umal.
In contrast to Al-Shabab’s rapid ascension following Ethiopia’s 2006 intervention in Somalia, Al-Ictissam’s growth has been more clandestine, focusing on religious propagation and subtle political maneuvering. Despite initial difficulties in identifying adherents, recent successes in Lascanood have emboldened the group to declare an open Jihad against Somaliland’s democratic institutions. The Group believes Somaliland’s political system is the biggest obstacle to their long term plans of a Salafi Caliphate in the Horn of Africa. That is why the Al-Ictissam group has adopted a strategy of infiltrating the political systems of nations across the Horn of Africa. They can claim to have amongst their ranks the likes of Hirsi Haji Hassan leader of the Wadani opposition party of Somaliland. Notable defections, such as that of Abdirizak Khalif, formerly the Speaker of Somaliland’s House of Representatives, underscore the group’s influence. Khalif’s renunciation of Somaliland’s sovereignty and alignment with the “Huwan” group, alongside Al-Ictissam’s declaration of Jihad in late 2022, underscore the organization’s evolving tactics of stepping out of the dark and into the light as well as the complex challenges it poses to regional stability.
Staff: Somaliland Free Press
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